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A Neo-Nixon Doctrine for the Indian Ocean: Helping States Help 
Themselves 
 
Walter C. Ladwig, III 
Strategic Analysis, vol. 36, no. 3 (2012), pp. 384-399 
 
It has been suggested by some American foreign policy thinkers that the U.S. is 
approaching a watershed moment, comparable to the end of World War II or the Cold 
War, in terms of the degree to which America will need to reorient its foreign and 
defense policies.1  Indeed, domestic economic weakness, the debilitating effects of two 
protracted counterinsurgency campaigns and the rise of new powers in Asia are 
challenging its ability to maintain the unrivaled primacy it has possessed since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.2  Echoing fears of “imperial overstretch,” where historically 
the economic unsustainability of extensive military commitments abroad have led great 
powers into decline, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff has identified 
America’s growing debt burden as the most significant threat to the country’s national 
security.3  U.S. defense spending is set to decline by at least $450 billion, and potentially 
as much as $1 trillion, over the next decade as the Pentagon adapts to what some are 
calling a new age of austerity.4  Normally, such budgetary weakness would be expected 
to induce a period of strategic restraint in American foreign policy, however, U.S. global 
commitments are not shrinking; indeed, they may expand further as the Obama 
Administration “pivots” towards Asia.5 
Although arguments about American decline in the popular press are frequently 
overstated, in an environment of geopolitical uncertainty and fiscal austerity, attempting 
to do more with less requires national security strategies that identify the nation’s vital 
interests and clearly distinguish them from issues of secondary concern.  Even a country 
that continues to think of itself as the indispensible nation must recognize that not every 
development abroad affects an important U.S. security interest.  Excessive activity in a 
region of marginal national interest can stimulate resentment, squander scarce resources 
and contribute to overextension. 
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 In light of Washington’s demonstrated belief in the growing economic and 
strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, this article proposes an American regional 
strategy that matches the level of American effort with the core security interests at stake 
in the region.  Rather than struggle against the emergence of new powers, the “Neo-
Nixon Doctrine” proposed here embraces this trend by working to incorporate the Indian 
Ocean’s emerging powers into a multipolar regional security architecture that promotes 
an open economic order and liberal-democratic values while minimizing the fiscal and 
military burden on the United States for ensuring regional stability.  In doing so, this 
strategy prioritizes core U.S. interests by not diverting scarce defense resources to 
peripheral regions or issues, while furthering the regional ambitions of local partners with 
the goal of forming a stable and enduring regional order.  
 
 
Indian Ocean: Center Stage or Regional Sideshow? 
 
Ever since Robert Kaplan declared the Indian Ocean “center stage” for global 
politics in the 21st century, it has become the region du jour among U.S. national security 
analysts.6  This has led to a proliferation of workshops and reports on Indian Ocean 
Security from the think tanks and professional military education institutions that make 
up the American defense-intellectual establishment.7  As a tangible sign of the shift in 
American thinking, the current U.S. maritime strategy has reoriented the Navy and 
Marine Corps from their traditional two-ocean focus on the Atlantic and the Pacific to the 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific.8  
The arguments in favor of the region’s importance are well known. The thirty 
nations that constitute its littoral region contain one-third of the world’s population, as 
well as 55% of the world’s proven oil reserves, 35% of its gas, 40% of its gold, 60% of is 
uranium and 80% of its diamonds.9  These littoral areas also abound with important 
industrial raw materials, such as iron, titanium, chromate, lithium, bauxite, cobalt, nickel 
manganese, rubber and tin.10  Moreover, the Indian Ocean is a key transit route for oil 
from the Persian Gulf to reach consumers in Europe and Asia. Seventeen-million barrels 
of oil a day (90% of oil exported from the Gulf) transits by tanker through the Strait of 
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Hormuz and into the western reaches of the Indian Ocean.11  In terms of global trade, the 
Indian Ocean is a major conduit linking manufacturers in East Asia to markets in Europe, 
Africa and the Persian Gulf. In addition to carrying more than 2/3 of the world’s oil 
shipments, half of the world’s containerized cargo and one-third of its bulk cargo travels 
the ocean’s busy sea lanes annually.12   
At the same time, stability in the Indian Ocean littoral is a particular concern as 
the region has a high potential for producing failed states: Foreign Policy magazine’s 
2011 Failed States Index included seven littoral nations in its top 25.13  Moreover, the 
potential for inter-state conflict remains high, as a host of unresolved maritime or 
territorial disputes affect a region that lacks substantial collective security 
arrangements.14  The littoral is also plagued by a host of irregular security threats as the 
very same waterways that transport goods are also used for human smuggling, drug 
trafficking and gun running.  Moreover, the International Maritime Bureau assesses that 
the Indian Ocean has a high risk of piracy, particularly in the Gulf of Aden, Horn of 
Africa, the Bay of Bengal and the Straits of Malacca.15  Finally, in the context of the 
simultaneous rise of both India and China, Robert Kaplan has argued that “the Indian 
Ocean is where global struggles will play out in the 21st century.”16 
To what extent are U.S. national security interests affected by developments in 
this potentially volatile region?  The Indian Ocean has not traditionally assumed pride of 
place in U.S. strategic thinking.  Through the 1960s, American planners largely 
considered the Indian Ocean was a backwater.  Britain’s dominance at sea, combined 
with its imperial role in South Asia, led the U.S. to regard the region as a British 
preserve.17  In the early years of the Cold War, American strategy concentrated on the 
Atlantic and the Pacific Basin, because Western Europe and Japan were viewed as 
essential territory in the struggle against global Communism, whereas American 
involvement in the Indian Ocean littoral consisted primarily of economic and military 
aid, rather than the deployment of military forces.18  America’s direct involvement only 
increased in the wake of British withdrawal from “East of Suez,” in the late 1960s which 
appeared to coincide with increased Soviet presence in East Africa and South Asia.  The 
overthrow of the Shah—which eliminated a key security buffer between the Soviet Union 
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and the Persian Gulf—and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan justified further 
American concern about the security of the region in the 1980s. 
In the absence of the threat to the region posed by a hostile rival superpower such 
as the Soviet Union, the restrained approach towards the Indian Ocean from the early 
Cold War has much to commend it since regional developments are unlikely to have a 
direct impact on the United States.  Despite the aforementioned importance of the Indian 
Ocean as an energy corridor, the U.S. itself is not significantly reliant on the region for 
access to hydrocarbons.  Including marginal oil producers such as India, Australia, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, the Indian Ocean region barely accounted for 15% of U.S. oil 
imports in 2010.19  In contrast, many of America’s allies and key trading partners are 
highly dependent on the Indian Ocean for energy.  To the east, Japan receives 90% of its 
oil imports via the Indian Ocean, while 75% of China’s imports and 85% of India’ oil 
imports transit the region.20  Similarly, the economies of important American partners in 
the Asia-Pacific such as Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan and South Korea 
all receive more than 2/3 of their hydrocarbon imports from the Gulf.  To the west, 
roughly 1/3 of Europe’s oil imports pass through the Indian Ocean.21  Although the 
Indian Ocean region directly accounts for only a fraction of U.S. oil imports, it can be 
argued that the region retains critical importance for American energy security because 
oil is a globally integrated commodity, therefore a supply disruption anywhere would 
raise prices around the world, which would harm economic growth.  Sensible though this 
argument may seem, it is based more on hyperbole than hard fact.   While generations of 
policy-makers in the West were undoubtedly scarred by the oil shocks of the 1970s, as 
Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press have argued in great detail, the industrialized world 
actually has sufficient oil reserves, in both government controlled stocks and commercial 
inventories, to weather an oil supply disruption on par with the worst in history.22  
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the American economy is significantly less 
vulnerable to oil price shocks today than it was in the 1970s.23  The energy security of the 
United States does not turn on developments in the Indian Ocean. 
With respect to the goods trade, the Indian Ocean is also a far more important 
conduit for the nations of East Asia and Europe than it is for the United States.  The Asia-
Europe shipping route, via the Indian Ocean, is the world’s largest containerized trading 
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lane in the world.  Moreover, security scholars have noted that Europe is “heavily reliant 
upon the timely unhindered movement of vessels in the waters between the Indian Ocean 
and the Suez Canal.”24  Nevertheless, as the world’s largest economy, analysts have 
suggested that United States has a strong economic interest in the security of Indian 
Ocean shipping since the globalized nature of commodity markets means that the 
American economy would feel the effects of any major tremors in the Indian Ocean.25  
Despite the purported effects of globalization in linking economies around the world, the 
actual vulnerability of the United States to this kind of threat is frequently overstated, in 
large part because true threats to international trade are quite small: Even in the case of a 
major regional war, the economic impact on a non-participating, large open economy, 
such as the United States, is typically small in terms of capital flows, trade, and direct 
investment.26  Thus, economic imperatives cannot justify a major American regional 
commitment. 
The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean region to the U.S. is not based on its 
direct impact on America, but on its importance for key U.S. allies and partners.  As 
outlined by Christopher Layne, U.S. strategic priorities since the end of the Second 
World War have been to prevent a hostile peer-competitor from dominating Western 
Europe and industrialized East Asia.27  In so far as developments in the Indian Ocean 
affect key allies and partners in Europe and East Asia, who depend on the region energy 
and trade flows, they are of importance to the United States.  Therefore, the U.S. does 
have an interest and a role to play in promoting regional stability and security.  However, 
given that regional developments have a far greater direct impact on the nations of Asia 
and Europe, the cost and effort to promote regional security must be in line with the 
actual scale of the economic and political costs the U.S. would bear in the event of 
significant instability.  How can the U.S. best secure its interests in the Indian Ocean 
while promoting the well being of key allies and partners?  By helping regional powers 
help themselves. 
 
 
A Neo-Nixon Doctrine for the Indian Ocean 
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  Since the vital military and political interests of the United States do not require 
it to play a leading role in guarantying the security of the Indian Ocean littoral, the 
traditional American recipe of forward deployed forces backed by nuclear security 
guarantees is not necessarily appropriate for this region.  Instead, facilitating the 
emergence of a multipolar regional arrangement, with strong democratic states in leading 
roles, is the best means for achieving regional stability.  A model for this approach comes 
from a prior period of perceived “imperial overstretch” in the 1960s, when the Nixon 
administration grappled with America’s deteriorating global position resulting from its 
protracted involvement in Vietnam.  Popularly understood, the so-called Nixon Doctrine 
limited unconditional American security guarantees to smaller allies.  Instead, these local 
partners were charged with the primary responsibility for providing for their own 
defense, which would be facilitated by American aid and advice.28  A key shortcoming of 
the original Nixon Doctrine was its reliance on pro-Western autocrats, such as the Shah 
of Iran, whose unstable political systems proved to be a poor foundation for an enduring 
regional security structure.29  In contrast, this proposed “Neo-Nixon Doctrine” would 
focus on cultivating the major Indian Ocean littoral nations that are free, democratic, and 
financially capable of being net providers of security in their region.30  
The four principal states on which to anchor the strategy are Australia, Indonesia, 
India and South Africa.  These countries increasingly possess the economic means and 
military capabilities to provide for regional security, and each of these nations is also a 
presumptive hegemon in its respective sub-region of the Indian Ocean littoral (Oceania, 
Southeast Asia, South Asia and Southern Africa), which makes it natural for them to 
assume a leading role in regional security.  In explicitly seeking to foster the emergence 
of a robust multipolar security structure in the Indian Ocean that can contain most 
security threats without direct U.S. involvement, this strategy of self-interested altruism 
leverages the primary geopolitical trend in the region—namely the emergence of second-
tier powers.  By putting liberal democracies—who share an interest in maintaining an 
open economic order and minimizing great power conflict—at the center of this 
arrangement, U.S. regional goals can be advanced by encouraging local powers to pursue 
their own national interests.  This core of major littoral powers can also provide a 
foundation for multi-lateral efforts that bring both regional and extra-regional actors 
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together to address issues of collective concern, such as energy security and the free 
transit of goods. 
As with the original Nixon Doctrine, capacity building of regional partners is the 
primary means by which the U.S. facilitates security in the Indian Ocean region.  
American efforts would focus on supporting the efforts of these countries to develop their 
own military strength in a manner that would allow them to emerge as independent 
regional actors.  In particular, arms sales and technology transfers would seek to enhance 
their capability to secure their own territory, police their immediate region and deter 
intervention by hostile powers.  This requires the development of defensive weapons 
systems for safe-guarding territory such as maritime surveillance aircraft and unmanned 
aerial vehicles; anti-submarine warfare platforms; advanced air-defense systems; diesel-
electric submarines; long-range anti-ship missiles, and smart naval mines.  Patrolling and 
policing further from home would be facilitated by an expanded expeditionary capability 
which requires both airborne and naval tankers.  Amphibious platforms have proven 
highly effective in regional humanitarian response situations and expanding the number 
of amphibious ships in partner navies should be a priority. 
Grant aid, rather than arms sales, makes it significantly easier to convince a 
foreign partner to acquire the system or technology that America feels is most appropriate 
to its needs.  The reality of a strategy designed to facilitate regional security provision by 
local powers is that they know it is in the U.S. interest to help build their capacity.  As a 
result, they may be less likely to purchase the types of systems the U.S. advises with their 
own funds if they believe that the U.S. will gift it to them anyway.  This kind of free-
riding is less than desirable; however, it is still far more cost-effective for the United 
States to subsidize the military capacity of local partners than it is for America to take the 
lead in providing regional security itself.  This is particularly true since the manpower, 
operations and maintenance costs of the additional military capability would be borne by 
the local country.  In order to effectively enhance the military capacity of friendly 
democratic states, U.S. technology transfer rules and export control guidelines would 
require a restructuring. 
A key advantage of this strategy is that it furthers the interests of local powers 
while also securing American aims. U.S. aid would increase their power and facilitate 
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their order-producing role in their respective sub-region, both of which would boost their 
claim to major power status.  In many respects, the U.S. would simply be encouraging 
and facilitating an expansion of existing behavior.  For example, of its own initiative, the 
South African navy has undertaken anti-piracy patrols in the Mozambique gap; while the 
Indian Navy has engaged in joint surveillance of key waterways near the Straits of 
Malacca with Indonesia and Thailand, patrolled off the coast of Madagascar and 
Mozambique as well as in the Gulf of Oman, and worked to enhance the coast guard 
capacity of several small island nations in the Indian Ocean, such as the Maldives and the 
Seychelles. 
While American partners focus on local security issues, the U.S. would 
concentrate on maintaining command of the global commons.31  This would work to 
ensure that local partners and U.S. allies retain unfettered access to the global trading 
system, beyond the reach of their individual militaries.  Rather than undertake a large-
scale forward deployment of forces in the Indian Ocean, the U.S. would carefully 
shepherd its own military power, intervening only if the leading local powers proved 
unable to manage regional security on their own.  This does not mean that the U.S. would 
completely withdraw its military presence from the region. However, maritime and air-
power based offshore, rather than forward deployed ground forces, would constitute the 
majority of the U.S. presence in the region.  Joint training and bi-laterial/multi-lateral 
military exercises would be an important focus of American efforts both to strengthen 
local military capability as well as deepen interoperability with regional forces in case 
U.S. intervention should ever be necessary.  Continued political and military engagement 
would also be beneficial for preserving access to a network of forward operating bases 
that would facilitate U.S. power projection into the region in case of a major contingency.   
With respect to irregular security challenges in the region, American nuclear non-
proliferation efforts would continue unabated.  Ideally, regional security cooperation 
would extend to nuclear matters in a manner that meets the concerns of countries such as 
South Africa, India and Indonesia, who have previously resisted joining such efforts as 
the Proliferation Security Initiative.  In so far as nuclear proliferation by states in the 
Indian Ocean region is driven by security concerns vis-à-vis the United States, a 
restrained U.S. posture could reduce some of that anxiety.  With respect to terrorism, the 
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capacity-building focus of this strategic approach certainly would be extended to the 
counter-terrorism realm, and to more than just the democratic major powers, wherever it 
is recognized that the contacts, local knowledge and language skills of foreign police and 
intelligence services are best positioned and willing to uncover and disrupt terrorist 
groups.  The U.S. can bolster such agencies through training, equipment and technical 
support, the latter of which is America’s comparative advantage and can act as a key 
force multiplier with out an overtly visible presence.  Ideally, local counterterrorism 
efforts would be handled by local governments, but should they prove unable to act, the 
U.S. would be prepared to assist with air strikes or small-scale raids carried out by special 
operations forces stationed at low-profile remote bases in the region.  To the extent that 
anti-American terrorism is fostered by the visible presence of U.S. forces in key countries 
in the region, an Indian Ocean strategy that minimizes the “footprint” of U.S. forces 
would reduce that source of antagonism.32 
 
 
Diplomatic Measures 
 
In addition to strengthening the capability of individual states, the U.S. must 
facilitate the deepening and broadening of existing political and security relationships 
among India, South Africa, Indonesia, and Australia in a manner that would enable them 
to manage regional crises in partnership if necessary.  Rather than starting from scratch, 
however, this effort capitalizes on the existing ties that these countries have already 
forged with each other.  For example, India currently possesses strategic partnerships 
with Australia and Indonesia and has sought to deepen its defense cooperation with South 
Africa through joint military training, while Australia and Indonesia are each other’s 
most important foreign policy partner in the region.  
Although the United States can leverage its own bilateral relationships with these 
states to promote regional cooperation, the goal is not to recreate East Asia’s hub-and-
spoke system, with the U.S. at the center.  Instead, the objective is to foster regional 
linkages that can enhance political coordination and contingency planning to the point 
where joint or multilateral operations could and would be readily undertaken in the 
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absence of direct U.S. leadership.  This process should begin with bilateral and 
multilateral discussions with Canberra, Delhi, Jakarta and Pretoria.  Regular multilateral 
exercises should be held as frequently as possible to promote interoperability, intelligence 
cooperation and shared threat perception.  Modeled on the Milan series of naval 
exercises, these should include other littoral nations (Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore) 
and interested extra-regional actors (Japan and South Korea).  Furthermore, military-to-
military exchanges of officers from these target countries should be significantly 
increased, with specific attention given to developing bilateral ties not only between the 
U.S. and the next generation of military leaders in the target country, but also among the 
future military leaders of the major regional democracies to help facilitate a deepening of 
those ties as well. 
Although there is a strong normative element to basing a regional security 
strategy around a core of liberal democracies, the goal is not to form an ideological bloc 
in the Indian Ocean, nor is it predicated on changing the domestic political arrangements 
of key Indian Ocean states.  Instead, it attempts to forge a lasting regional security 
architecture that blends realist and idealist considerations by putting at its core the 
leading economic and military powers in the various sub-regions of the Indian Ocean 
who also share a common commitment to upholding international norms and common 
interests with respect to regional security, which are important for both maintaining 
stability in the region and ensuring long-term cooperation.  Other nations from the region, 
or extra-regional powers who are concerned with the security and stability of the Indian 
Ocean, would be welcome to contribute to these efforts provided they embrace these 
established norms for managing the sea lanes and airspace of the littoral region. 
 
Multilateral Security Initiatives 
 
Although pan-Indian Ocean multilateral fora have not generally developed into 
strong institutions, both India and Australia have historically been enthusiastic 
proponents of regional organizations.33  The U.S. should attempt to channel both 
countries’ efforts into leadership of a regional collective security effort, by working 
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through an existing organization, which has the legitimacy of indigenous origins that a 
more blatantly American-fostered effort would lack.  
 One institution with particular promise is the recently established Indian Ocean 
Naval Symposium (IONS). This Indian initiative, open to naval chiefs from each country 
in the region, provides a forum for the heads of regional navies to discuss maritime 
security concerns.  At the regional level, IONS can assist in promoting collective action 
among member states and can serve as a model for similar groupings of Chiefs of the 
Army, Air Force and even police.  The United States should support IONS by 
encouraging Australia, Indonesia and South Africa to host future symposia to give the 
nascent institution staying power and a broader endorsement from the leading navies of 
the region. 
The United States should also encourage IONS members to create a second 
broader forum, which included extra-regional actors as dialogue partners, to foster real 
discussion among key stake-holders in the Indian Ocean.  An “IONS +” that included the 
U.S., Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, France and the UK would provide 
an opportunity for interested nations to focus on common concerns about energy security 
and piracy in the Indian Ocean.  Meaningful engagement on these “small s” security 
issues could pave the way for a more robust dialogue which could facilitate the kind of 
diplomatic intercourse and information-sharing that can dampen the mistrust and doubt 
which presently exists among some regional and extra-regional powers.  Moreover, 
active membership in a regional cooperative security organization would be a key way 
for major regional and extra-regional powers to demonstrate their benign intentions and 
support for the status quo. 
 
 
Engaging Major Regional Powers 
 
Implementing the Neo-Nixon Doctrine in the Indian Ocean would require 
American policy-makers to undertake a mindset-shift since, unlike in East Asia, the 
majority of the partners states proposed here are not treaty allies of the United States.  
Washington would have to become comfortable with the notion that these counties will 
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follow foreign policies based on their own self-interest, which will converge with the 
U.S. in some areas and possibly diverge in others.  Moreover, it should be recognized 
ahead of time that as the U.S. succeeds in strengthening these states militarily, their 
foreign policy autonomy may grow.  However, on balance, strong democratic states in 
the Indian Ocean with the military means to defend themselves and provide for regional 
security will foster a region that is in keeping with U.S. regional goals. 
 
India 
 
Within the Indian Ocean, India emerges as the fulcrum of the Neo-Nixon 
Doctrine because it can play a role in key sub-regions such as South Asia, Southeast 
Asia, East Africa and, to an extent, the Persian Gulf.  With the largest indigenous navy in 
the Indian Ocean, as India’s economy continues to achieve record economic growth, its 
interests in maintaining good order at sea and protecting the region’s sea lanes is 
converging with that of other trading nations.34  New Delhi has already demonstrated a 
desire to play a leading role in Indian Ocean security, and cooperation on regional 
security could be the “next big thing” to drive forward Indo-U.S. relations.  In bolstering 
India’s naval capacity, beyond the systems discussed above, the U.S. should consider 
sharing naval nuclear technology.  Since India has already managed to construct an 
indigenous test-bed nuclear submarine, assistance from the United States should be 
actively extended to help jump start India’s naval nuclear propulsion program, either by 
loaning a nuclear submarine for experimentation or engaging in direct technology 
collaboration.  This would facilitate the emergence of a true blue water Indian navy 
which could undertake sea-lane security missions far from home. The Neo-Nixon 
Doctrine has a high degree of synergy with India’s regional ambitions by supporting New 
Delhi’s clear emergence as the legitimate hegemon in South Asia and the leading power 
in the Indian Ocean region.   
 
Indonesia 
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Given the size, economic strength and natural role as the leading state of the 
Southeast Asia sub-region, Indonesia is an obvious focal point of American attention.  
This is particularly true in light of the democratic consolidation that has taken place there 
since 2004, while traditional American partners in the region such as the Philippines and 
Thailand have struggled with democracy and human rights.  Indonesia possesses the 
Indian Ocean’s second largest navy and shares the interests of the U.S. and other major 
regional powers in both ensuring the free trade of goods and suppressing piracy.  In terms 
of bilateral ties with other leading IO nations, Australia and Indonesia each recognize the 
other as one of its most important bilateral relationships, while India and Indonesia have 
forged a strategic partnership.  The Neo-Nixon Doctrine would facilitate two key goals 
for Indonesia: achieving closer security cooperation with the United States and playing a 
greater role in international affairs.  While the U.S. and Indonesia share critical interests 
in arresting the spread of violent extremism and managing geopolitical change in the 
Indo-Pacific, which can provide an impetus for closer cooperation, it will take time to 
strengthen the bilateral partnership.  Focusing on broad areas of common interest as the 
Neo-Nixon Doctrine does, is the best way to move the relationship forward. 
 
Australia 
 
Australia is a treaty ally of the United States and possesses the region’s third 
largest navy.  It has deepened security ties with Indonesia and India is its second most 
important bilateral link in the entire littoral region.  Canberra also has a significant ability 
to forge partnerships with many key Indian Ocean littoral nations since it is not viewed as 
a threat in the region.35  This puts Australia in a key position to expand the breadth and 
scope of its maritime surveillance and patrolling into the Eastern Indian Ocean.  
However, encouraging Australia to assume a more robust role in the Indian Ocean may 
pose some diplomatic challenges.  Although Australia possesses one of the largest 
exclusive economic zones in the Indian Ocean, it has traditionally neglected this region in 
favor of the Asia-Pacific as the focus of its foreign policy.  Moreover, while Australia has 
a strong interest in not seeing the Indian Ocean become an arena of great power 
competition, the country’s dependence on China as a market for its raw materials has 
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made some of its leadership wary of actions that could be construed as contributing to the 
containment of China.  Nevertheless, the present government has supported U.S. plans to 
increase its military presence in Australia and the broader Asia-Pacific region.36   
 
South Africa 
 
Alongside India and Australia, South Africa has traditionally been a regional 
leader in the Indian Ocean; however in recent years its attention has increasingly been 
focused internally and on continental Africa.  Strategically located along the Cape of 
Good Hope— the favorite route for oil tankers too large to transit the Suez Canal—South 
Africa is the only sub-Saharan African country with the ability to carry out meaningful 
anti-piracy operations in its sub-region.  Although the South African navy has been 
undertaking anti-piracy efforts in the Southeastern Indian Ocean, these operations are 
severely restricted by current budget limitations.  It may be worthwhile for the U.S. to 
consider partially financing South Africa’s efforts to combat piracy and patrol its adjacent 
sea lanes.  Although U.S.-South African ties are notionally cordial, Pretoria tends to 
support nations that take views independent from the West.  Nevertheless, this foreign 
policy orientation poses less of a problem for the Neo-Nixon Doctrine since the strategic 
approach does not attempt to cajole South Africa to follow a Western agenda, but rather 
empower it to do what it is already doing in order to contribute to Indian Ocean security. 
 
 
Regional Considerations 
 
Eastern Indian Ocean 
Coordination and cooperation among the respective navies of Australia, India and 
Indonesia help ensure the free transit of shipping through the vital choke points of the 
Malacca and Lombok Straits.  The United States can encourage and support these efforts 
by working with the three countries to share intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) data to create a full-spectrum maritime domain awareness in the Eastern reaches of 
the Indian Ocean.  India has already undertaken coordinated patrolling of the northern 
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approaches of the Straits of Malacca with Indonesia.  Expanding that effort to include 
more regular Indian-Indonesian combined patrols, Indonesian-Australian patrolling in the 
vicinity of Lombok, as well as intelligence sharing and combined exercises, can help 
ensure that the sea lanes in the eastern stretches of the Indian Ocean are secure. 
 
 
Western Indian Ocean 
Although the triangle of India-Indonesia-Australia brings together the most 
capable nations in the region to focus on the Eastern Indian Ocean, there is no similar 
configuration of leading states to the West.  Since Europe directly benefits from oil 
transiting the Cape, the EU or individual member states might be a source of financial 
support for the South African Navy.  France in particular could emerge as a security 
partner for South Africa. France maintains a permanent military presence in the region—
including more than a dozen naval vessels—through its overseas territories in the 
southern Indian Ocean and bases in Djibouti and Abu Dhabi and has been conducting 
anti-piracy operations off of East Africa since 2005.  Paris and Pretoria already undertake 
joint military exercises, including anti-piracy training and are looking to deepen bilateral 
cooperation in the Southern Indian Ocean.  Moreover, France has good relations with 
India—to whom it has supplied advanced conventional submarines—and has bilateral 
agreements with Australia which facilitate surveillance and law-enforcement operations 
in their adjoining territorial waters in the Southern Indian Ocean. 
Between India and South Africa, there is a notable gap in the Persian Gulf region. 
In the near term the U.S. must still play an active role providing security in this zone.  
Achieving American security goals in the Persian Gulf, which centers on preventing 
major hydrocarbon reserves from being dominated by a hostile power, does not require 
the maintenance of forward ground forces.  With the three contenders for regional 
leadership—Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq—all strong enough to defend themselves but too 
weak to mount a bid for regional hegemony, the status quo is relatively safe.  If 
necessary, the U.S. can provide security assistance to aid local states in balancing each 
other to block the rise of a single region-dominating power.  However, the primary 
security function carried out by the U.S. in the region should be to pledge to oppose any 
 16 
violation of the territorial integrity of any major oil-producing state, which can be 
accomplished with a naval presence and intervention forces that are not stationed in 
theater. 
 
 
America’s Enabling Capabilities 
 
The Neo-Nixon Doctrine does not require the U.S. to maintain a significant 
peacetime military presence in the Indian Ocean littoral region.  Those assets which are 
forward deployed, mainly from the Air Force and the Navy, will be platforms that are key 
capability enablers for the local powers America is aiding.  Given the U.S. military’s 
comparative advantage in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, for example, 
deployment of long-range high endurance UAVs such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the 
MQ-4C Broad Area Maritime Surveillance can facilitate common domain awareness.  At 
sea, the U.S. Navy would maintain a carrier equivalent in the Northwestern Indian Ocean, 
in combination with a robust deployment of guided-missile submarines that leverage the 
submarine tender and crew swap facilities at Diego Garcia to prolong time on station.  In 
terms of air forces, the main focus would be on strategic airlift, long-range bombers and 
tankers that stage through forward bases.  In the event direct American intervention was 
required, attack submarines would be valuable tools for seizing and maintaining 
command of the sea so that the U.S. could use major sea lanes to surge forces from out of 
theater to assist partner nations. 
Preserving the capability to surge forces into the region in a contingency puts a 
premium on the prepositioning of equipment stocks as well as ensuring access to forward 
operating sites that can facilitate power projection.  The U.S. already has access to 
facilities on the rim of the Indian Ocean, such as the headquarters of the 5th fleet in 
Bahrain; the Air Force’s facility at Al Udeid in Qatar; a military presence in Dijibouti on 
the African continent; and Changi Naval Base in Singapore on the far side of the Straits 
of Malacca.  The Neo-Nixon Doctrine does not require an extensive network of 
permanent U.S. bases in the region; however, the ability to surge forces would be 
enhanced by contingency access to air and naval bases or cooperative security locations 
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in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India’s Andaman and Nicobar islands, Australia’s Cocos Islands 
and the Seychelles.  
Diego Garcia emerges as an important hub in this regard.  The island facilitates 
U.S. power projection through the prepositioning of Army and Marine Corps brigade 
sets, long-range bomber operations, the replenishment of naval surface combatants, and 
the strike and special operations capabilities of guided-missile submarines that can call at 
the atoll’s wharf.  The U.S. government must take proactive steps to ensure continued 
access to this facility after the present agreement with the British government expires in 
2016. 
 
 
Risks and Uncertainties 
 
A regional strategy that empowers local actors to maintain regional security 
carries several apparent risks; however upon close examination, none appear so serious as 
to render the proposed strategy unworkable. 
First, it might be the case that the leading counties of the region are less interested 
in assuming a regional leadership role or providing regional public goods in the manner 
described.  This issue is most salient with respect to India, where the government has 
previously resisted proposals for multi-lateral security dialogues that are not based on the 
UN or a broad based regional grouping.  As noted previously in this article, all four of the 
leading democratic states in the region have undertaken efforts to provide security in their 
respective sub-regions as well as forge strategic ties with each other.  The effort required 
under the Neo-Nixon Doctrine is simply more of the same.  Moreover, for states 
concerned about preserving their strategic autonomy, this proposal doesn’t necessarily 
require a formal multi-lateral structure.  At a minimum, an expansion of existing 
cooperation so that joint crisis response, such as the unprecedented cooperation between 
the Indian and Australian navies that occurred in the wake of the 2004 Boxing Day 
Tsunami, can be conducted efficiently would be sufficient.   
A second related concern is that the state of bilateral relations between the major 
democratic powers in the region, or between those countries and the US, preclude the 
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kind of cooperation required.  Indonesian-Australian ties, for example, have peaked and 
troughed over the past decade.  Yet, that has not prevented the two governments from 
deepening their security ties over the same interval.  Indeed, the opportunity to cooperate 
on regional security matters provides a new forum for the pursuit of common interests, 
which may give a jolt to bilateral relationships, such as that between Jakarta and 
Canberra.37 U.S. ability to cooperate with and assist India over the past decade has been 
constrained by Washington’s dependence on Pakistan for logistical support of operations 
in Afghanistan.  However, as the U.S. moves to draw down is role in Afghanistan, the 
obvious divergence in strategic interests between Washington and Islamabad has become 
clear.38  Although the U.S. will continue to require cooperation with Pakistan, the lavish 
military aid and support of the past ten years will not continue as Washington focuses on 
the convergence of interests with Delhi. 
Third, a restrained regional role could embolden a revisionist local state or an 
extra-regional power to challenge the status quo.  Local powers may also have doubts 
about America’s willingness to intervene in a major crisis, leading them to bandwagon 
with such challengers.  Such concerns are valid; however, since the Indian Ocean has 
never been a theater of primary importance for the U.S., American restraint there would 
not be considered as significant a sign of American decline or disinterest as it would be in 
East Asia or Western Europe.  Moreover, concern that local powers might bandwagon 
with challengers in the absence of a major U.S. presence ignores these states’ own 
interests and capabilities.  Uncertainty about U.S. intentions may actually provide 
incentives for them to develop their own military capabilities, an outcome the U.S. 
desires.   
A fourth possible concern is that the “self-reliance” expected of major regional 
powers may lead to the development of nuclear weapons, which runs contrary to U.S. 
non-proliferation goals.  This is indeed a possibility; however, it must be recognized that 
a major U.S. regional presence also has the potential to encourage other littoral countries 
to seek nuclear weapons.  Moreover, as the U.S. tacitly acknowledged in its nuclear deal 
with India, the development of nuclear weapons by a democratic state for self-defense is 
not a threat to the U.S. in the manner that proliferation by a revisionist state is.  
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Fifth, it could be argued that bolstering the military capabilities of certain states in 
the region might provoke concern from some of their smaller neighbors.  It should be 
noted, however, that the majority of the systems in question are defensive in nature.  
Moreover, the counties being assisted are democratic states which have already 
demonstrated the ability to be responsible stakeholders through their own efforts to 
contribute to regional security.  While enhancing the military capability of leading states 
may cause some anxiety, it is certainly balanced by the reduction of tensions associated 
with a more subdued American presence. 
A sixth potential criticism is that the United States is so far removed from the 
region that unless American forces were forward deployed, they would be unable to 
respond to a major crisis in a timely manner.  However, since the first-responder role 
under this strategy is devolved to local states, with the U.S. intervening only if they fail, 
the likelihood of a crisis requiring an immediate American response is very low.  
Moreover, prepositioned stocks of equipment in theater, such as the Army and Marine 
Corps brigade sets at Diego Garcia, can speed response.  Historically the U.S. has been 
able to deter further military action by revisionist states in the region with only symbolic 
“tripwire” forces, such as the elements of the 82nd airborne that were deployed to Saudi 
Arabia in the immediate aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. 
Finally, there is a concern that when the U.S. relies on other countries to advance 
its interests, they often end up advancing their own instead.  The key fact to emphasize is 
that America’s regional interests are well aligned with those of the major states of the 
Indian Ocean region.  At its core, this strategic approach is based on the belief that on 
aggregate, the preferences of the region’s leading democratic states will intersect with 
America’s foreign policy goals.  Moreover, it is assumed that these states are more likely 
to cooperate with each other to maintain stability and provide regional public goods (such 
as sea lane security) in a manner that enhances collective security in a mutually beneficial 
manner.  Although disagreement may occur over tactics or the relative priority given to a 
particular issue, the desired end-state is largely identical. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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 The security and stability of the Indian Ocean not only benefits the nations of the 
immediate littoral region, but also America’s European and Asian allies, and therefore the 
U.S. itself.  In approaching this region of extrinsic importance, the resources and effort 
that Washington dedicates must align with the real security interests at stake.  Rather than 
take the lead in guaranteeing regional security, the U.S. should help the leading 
democratic states of the region help themselves. 
Strengthening the capacities of Australia, India, Indonesia and South Africa to 
more effectively police their immediate regions advances America’s regional goals while 
limiting its involvement in conflicts and crises that are peripheral to core American 
interests.  Moreover, by supporting and strengthening the natural hegemons in the various 
sub-regions of the Indian Ocean littoral in their efforts to secure their own interests, 
American power is more likely to be viewed as a force for good.  If properly bolstered by 
the U.S., this core of regional powers can provide a deterrent to any revisionist state that 
may seek to overturn the regional status quo.  Cooperative security efforts channeled 
through an indigenous regional security organization—incorporating regional and extra-
regional stakeholders—can both assist with collective efforts to respond to low-level 
regional instability, such as piracy, and provide a means for the major powers active in 
the Indian Ocean region to discuss their interests and concerns in a manner that can 
ameliorate tensions.  The sum total of these efforts would lay a solid foundation for an 
enduring regional order that enhances stability and prosperity for all nations in the region 
and beyond. 
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